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Abstract
This paper studies …rms’ incentives to invest in environmental R&D under dif-
ferent market structures (Cournot and Bertrand) and environmental policy instru-
ments (emission standards, taxes, tradeable permits and auctioned permits). Be-
cause of market strategic e¤ects, R&D incentives vary widely across market struc-
tures and instruments. For example, when …rms’ products are strategic substitutes
(i.e., Cournot), either emission standards, taxes or auctioned permits can provide
the most incentives. But when …rms’ products are strategic complements, either
taxes or auctioned permits provide the most incentives. If markets are perfectly
competitive, however, permits and emission standards o¤er similar incentives that
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1are lower than those o¤ered by taxes (JEL: L13, L50, Q28; key words: environment,
regulation, market structure, innovation)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The relationship between market structure and technical progress has attracted signif-
icant attention from economists over the last decades. Motivated by the notion that
technical progress is perhaps the main vehicle to solve environmental problems in the
long-run (Kneese and Schultze, 1978), economists have also focused on the extent to
which di¤erent environmental policy instruments provide …rms with incentives to invest
in environmental R&D.1 This latter work has been carried out under the assumption
of perfect competition, abstracting from market structure considerations (Tietenberg,
1985; Milliman and Prince, 1989; Jung et al., 1996; Requate, 1998; and Parry, 1999).2
In general, authors have found that market-based regulatory instruments such as taxes,
tradeable permits and auctioned permits provide more R&D incentives than command-
and-control instruments such as emission standards.3
In this paper, I extend the study of …rms’ incentives to invest in environmental R&D
by considering the possibility of imperfect competition in output and permit markets.
Since real-world markets are rarely perfectly competitive, extending the environmental
1See, for example, Hahn and Stavins (1992), and Newell et al. (1999) for very recent empirical work.
2One exception is Biglaiser and Horotiwz (1995) that consider …rms interaction in the market for the
discovery of new pollution-control technologies and assume perfect competition in the output market.
While they focus on the optimal design of a technology standard coupled with a tax, in this paper I
focus on the comparison among individual instruments.
3Less consistent with the above …ndings are the works of Magat (1978) and Malueg (1989), who showed
that relative incentives may vary depending on …rm’s speci…c technologies and elements of instrument
design. La¤ont and Tirole (1996) have also shown that plain tradeable permits may o¤er little R&D
incentives, but the introduction of advance permits and options can restore these incentives. However,
they did not compare permits with other instruments.
2innovation literature to allow for imperfect competition can have important policy impli-
cations. In fact, the industrial organization literature has shown that strategic or market
interactions in oligopoly markets can signi…cantly a¤ect “investment decisions”, includ-
ing cost-reducing R&D (Brander and Spencer, 1983; Spence, 1984; Fudenberg and Tirole,
1984; and Bulow et al., 1985).4 Depending on the market structure, some …rms may have
incentives to overinvest while others may have incentives to underinvest. While it is likely
that these strategic interactions also a¤ect …rms’ incentives to invest in environmental
R&D, it remains to be seen whether the changes in incentives signi…cantly a¤ect the “en-
vironmental R&D rankings” found by previous studies. It may well be that incentives
under market-based instruments are still greater (although di¤erent in magnitude from
the earlier …ndings) than they are under command-and-control instruments.
To study the e¤ect of imperfect competition on environmental R&D, I extend the
model of Montero (2002) and have two …rms (1 and 2) competing in either quantities
(i.e., Cournot competition) or prices (i.e., Bertrand competition) in the output market
and at the same time being subject to an environmental regulation. The regulatory goal
is to limit emissions at some predetermined level by means of one of the following four
regulatory instruments: emission standards, taxes, (grandfathered) tradeable permits and
auctioned permits. Firms can reduce their compliance costs and improve their position
in the output market by investing in environmental R&D.
As explained by Tirole (1988, pp. 323-336), in such a market-regulatory setting, …rm
1’s incentive to invest in R&D results from two e¤ects. The direct or cost-minimizing
4For a complete survey on strategic interaction in oligopoly markets, see Shapiro (1989) and Tirole
(1988).
3e¤ect accounts for that fraction of …rm 1’s cost savings (or pro…t increase) that does not
a¤ect …rm 2’s choice of output. In other words, this e¤ect would exist even if …rm 1’s
R&D investment were not observed by …rm 2 before the latter determined its output. The
strategic e¤ect, on the other hand, results from the in‡uence of …rm 1’s R&D investment
on …rm 2’s choice of output. For example, …rm 2 may increase its output as an optimal
response to …rm 1’s R&D investment adversely a¤ecting …rm 1’s pro…ts. Hence, it may
be optimal for …rm 1 to invest less in R&D in order to avoid an aggressive response by
…rm 2 in the output market. The sign of this strategic e¤ect may be positive or negative
depending on the market-regulatory structure. Not surprisingly, after accounting for
direct and strategic e¤ects, the results of this paper indicate that the “R&D rankings” of
instruments di¤er in many ways from earlier …ndings. In fact, I …nd situations in which
standards o¤er greater R&D incentives than the other three instruments.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I develop the basic model
and explain how to estimate …rms’ incentives to invest in environmental R&D. In Section
3, I assume that …rms compete à la Cournot in the output market and estimate R&D
incentives under the four aforementioned regulatory instruments. In Section 4, I repeat
the analysis of Section 3 but now assuming that …rms compete à la Bertrand. In Section
5, I develop some numerical examples to illustrate and complement some of the analytical
results of the previous sections using the social optimum solution as a benchmark. In
Section 6, I discuss R&D under perfect competition and provide concluding remarks.
42T h e M o d e l
Consider 2 pro…t-maximizing …rms (denoted by i and j) competing under di¤erent market
and regulatory structures. When …rms compete à la Cournot in the output market (i.e.,
…rms’ outputs are strategic substitutes), the inverse demand function is P = P(Q),w h e r e
P is the output market price and Q = qi +qj is industry output. When …rms compete á
la Bertrand (i.e., …rms’ outputs are strategic complements), the demand curve faced by
…rm i is qi = Di(pi;p j),w h e r epi is the price chosen by …rm i.
Without loss of generality, …rm i produces qi at no cost, and in the absence of any
regulation, production leads also to qi units of emission. Emissions can be reduced at a
total cost of C(ri),w h e r eri is the amount of emissions reduced, and, as usual, C0
i > 0
and C00
i > 0 . It is convenient to re-write the abatement function as Ci(qi ¡ ei),w h e r e
qi ¡ei ´ ri and ei is …rm i’s emissions after abatement. Thus, if the …rm does not abate
any pollution ei = qi.
The environmental regulatory structure consists of a goal and instrument. I assume
that the regulatory goal is to limit aggregate emissions at some level E = ei + ej by
means of one of the following four regulatory instruments: emission standards, taxes,
(grandfathered) tradeable permits and auctioned permits. Under emission standards,
…rms’ emissions are limited to ei and ej respectively, such that ei + ej = E. Under tax
regulation, …rms pay ¿ dollars for each unit of emissions. The tax level ¿ is set based
on the production technology, output demand, and current abatement technology (i.e.,
before R&D) to yield E. Under permits regulation, a total number of E permits are
either distributed freely or auctioned o¤. I assume that each instrument design remains
5unchanged regardless the amount of R&D undertaken afterwards. Alternatively, one
could assume that the regulator is unable to observe R&D investments or that observes
them after a long time.
Firms engage in output competition taking into account R&D investments that can
reduce their environmental compliance costs, and hence, their ability to compete in the
market. Following Spence (1984), I assume that if …rm i and …rm j invest in environ-
mental R&D, abatement costs reduce from Ci(qi¡ei) to kiCi(qi¡ei),w h e r eki is a R&D
production function of the form5
ki = fi(Ki + µKj) (1)
where Ki is …rm’s i R&D e¤ort with a total cost of viKi,6 f(0) = 1, f(1) > 0, f0 < 0,
f00 > 0,a n d0 · µ · 1 is a parameter intended to capture possible spillovers. If µ =0
there are no spillovers, while if µ =1the bene…ts of each …rm’s R&D e¤orts are fully
shared.7
Depending on the regulatory instrument, the solution of the model involves either a
two-period or three-period equilibrium. In the case of emission standards and taxes there
are two periods. First, the two …rms choose R&D levels Ki and Kj respectively, which
5This way of modeling innovation applies more naturally to production process innovation at the
…rm. For example, under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendements electric utilities have been
making “R&D e¤orts” to retro…t their boilers to burn di¤erent type of coals and hence reduce their
compliance costs.
6Although one could simply treat Ki as dollars invested in R&D, this formulation facilitates the
numerical resolution of the model. Still, I will often use the words “R&D investment” to refer to K.
7Note that innovation process could also be modeled as a patent race where …rms compite to discover
a new technology k (< 1) that reduces abatement costs. This sort of race gives rise to the “common
pool” e¤ect where …rms tend to overinvesment in R&D (Loury, 1979); something we do not have in this
model but that should not change the qualitative results of the paper.
6are known to both …rms, and then, actions ai and aj (which can be either quantities
or prices), and emission levels ei and ej are simultaneously determined. In the case of
permits, there are three periods. First, the two …rms choose R&D investments Ki and
Kj, then, emission levels ei and ej (by the amount of permits withheld) and permits price
¾ are determined, and …nally, actions ai and aj are resolved.8
To decide upon the amount of R&D to undertake, …rms must have some expectation
about how the permits and output markets’ equilibria will be resolved. I assume, that
for any given level of R&D, …rms have complete information, and therefore, correctly
anticipate the Nash equilibrium afterwards, which is resolved either as a Cournot game
or as a Bertrand game with di¤erentiated products. When the environmental regulation
takes the form of tradeable or auctioned permits, I assume that for any given level of R&D
and expected output, …rms Nash bargain over the permits price ¾ (total quantity is …xed
at E). Since information is complete and there are no income e¤ects, the Nash bargaining
solution leads to the e¢cient level of emissions for any given level of investment (Ki and
Kj) and expected actions (ai and aj), regardless the initial distribution of the tradeable
permits (Spulber, 1989).
The optimal amount of R&D to undertake by …rm i under di¤erent market and regu-
latory structures could be obtained from maximizing ¼i(Ki;K j)¡vKi,w h e r e¼i(Ki;K j)
represents …rm i’s pro…ts resulting from the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the
permits (if it is the case) and output markets after observing R&D levels Ki and Kj.
The solution K¤
i must satisfy d¼i(Ki;K j)=dKi = vi,w h e r ed¼i(Ki;K j)=dKi is the total
8Since permits can be considered as another input into the production process, it is natural to think
that the permits market clears before the output market.
7derivative of ¼i with respect to Ki.
Rather than estimating K¤
i directly, however, in this paper I compare R&D incentives








0(Ki + µKj)=vi (2)
and f0 < 0,a n df00 > 0, it is immediate that K¤ increases with ¡d¼i=dki, regardless
the level of spillovers µ.9 Thus, if ¡d¼A
i =dki and ¡d¼B
i =dki are the total derivatives
corresponding to regulatory instruments A and B, respectively, we would have that A
leads to greater R&D than B does if ¡d¼A
i =dki > ¡d¼B
i =dki for all ki.I f¡d¼A
i =dki >
¡d¼B
i =dki for only some values of ki, however, we would have that instrument A may
lead to more, equal or less R&D than instrument B depending on the value of market,
regulatory, and R&D parameters. In this situation, for example, one instrument can more
e¤ectively force drastic innovations (big reductions in k) than the other instrument.
3 R&D under Cournot competition
In this section, I solve the model and estimate the value of ¡d¼i=dki for each regulatory
instrument when …rms compete à la Cournot. I assume that …rms are symmetric in all
respects, including their allocation of emission standards and tradeable permits.
9Since k = f((1 + µ)K), the FOC (2) can be entirely written as a function of k as d¼=dk =
v=f0(f¡1(k)),w h i c hs o l u t i o nk¤ will be unique and independent of µ. Note, however, that K¤ is a
decreasing function of µ.
83.1 Emission Standards
Under emission standards regulation and Cournot competition, for any given a level of
ki and kj (or Ki and Kj), …rm i maximizes pro…ts
¼i(ki;k j)=P(Q)qi ¡ kiCi(qi ¡ ei) (3)
subject to ei · ei,w h e r eei is the emission standard established for …rm i and Q =
qi+qj. Setting ei = ei, the second-period equilibrium is given by the following …rst-order




i(qi ¡ ei)=0 (4)
The third term of (4) indicates that the environmental regulation rises marginal produc-
tion costs by an amount equal to marginal abatement cost at ei = ei, which depends on
the amount of R&D undertaken.
The incentives to invest in R&D are obtained from the (negative) value of the total
derivative of (3) with respect to ki at the optimum level of output and emissions. Using









The …rst term on the right-hand side (RHS) of (5) is the direct e¤ect, which is always
positive and increasing with the amount of abatement qi ¡ ei. Hence, the tighter the
standard (i.e., the lower e becomes) the higher the direct incentives.
9The second term on the RHS of (5) is the strategic e¤ect. This e¤ect results from
the in‡uence of R&D investment on …rm j’s second period action. Since P 0 < 0,i t ss i g n
depends on the sign of dqj=dki. In this emission-standards-Cournot game, environmental
R&D can be interpreted as pure cost-reducing innovation, and therefore we should expect
that dqj=dki > 0. The implication is that a lower ki, which means lower marginal
abatement costs kiC0
i,r a i s e s… r mj’s relative costs reducing its output. This interaction
in the output market results in a positive strategic e¤ect, leading to more R&D than
otherwise.




= C(q ¡ e) ¡ P
0q
C0 ¢ (P0 + P00q)
(kC00 ¡ P 0)(3P0 +2 P 00q ¡ kC00)
(6)
Assuming that P 0 + P00q<0 to insure the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium in output (Gaudet and Salant, 1991), the fraction dqj=dki of the second
term in (6) is indeed positive and so is the strategic e¤ect.10 Using Fudenberg and
Tirole’s (1984) taxonomy, under these market and regulatory structures where products
are strategic substitutes, …rm’s optimal strategy is to behave as a “top dog” and overinvest
in R&D.11
10Note that the second term becomes also positive for a linear demand curve.
11Note that we are in a case of accomodation of entry rather than entry deterrence.
103.2 Taxes
Under tax regulation and Cournot competition, for any given a level of ki and kj,… r mi
maximizes pro…ts
¼i(ki;k j)=P(Q)qi ¡ kiCi(qi ¡ ei) ¡ ¿ei (7)
where ¿ is a …xed tax that …rm i must pay for each unit of emission. The second-period
equilibrium is given by the FOCs for ei and qi
kiC
0





0(Q)qi ¡ ¿ =0 (9)
Equation (8) indicates that at the optimum, marginal abatement costs are equal to the
tax level ¿, which implies that the oligopoly structure of the industry does not a¤ect the
cost-e¤ectiveness property of taxes. Eq. (9) shows that the environmental regulation
rises the marginal cost of production by ¿, which is independent of the amount of R&D.
The latter is because the …rm simultaneously adjusts qi and ei for (8) to always hold.
According to (9) then the optimal qi is independent of ki and kj, which in turn implies
that qj will be independent of ki and kj as well. The reason is that the marginal cost
of production (which here reduces to environmental compliance only) for both …rms is
constant at ¿.12 Therefore, dqj=dki =0and the (negative) value of the total derivative
12Note that if we let the production cost be cq the total marginal production cost will still be constant




= C(q ¡ e) (10)
Under tax regulation there is no strategic e¤ect because …rm i’s R&D investments do
not a¤ect its marginal production costs (they do a¤ect total costs), and consequently, its
output.
Let us now compare incentives under taxes and under emission standards. Equation
(10) di¤ers from (6) in some important ways. First, before any investment in R&D
is undertaken (i.e., ki =1 ), (4) and (9) indicate that output levels are the same by
regulatory design (tax level ¿ leads to emissions ei before R&D). This implies that the
direct e¤ect Ci(qi ¡ ei) is the same for both emission standards and taxes. However,
under emission standards regulation there is a positive strategic e¤ect that increases R&D
incentives, which is measured by the second term of (6). Thus, if the R&D function f(¢)
is such that only mild innovations take place (optimal k c l o s et o1 ) ,R & Di sl i k e l yt ob e
higher under emission standards.
Second, at positive levels of R&D (i.e., ki < 1), the direct e¤ect is greater under taxes




i(qi ¡ ei) (11)




i(qi ¡ ei)=¿ (12)
we can observe that under tax regulation qi is independent of ki, while under emission
standards qi must increase if ki drops for eq. (11) to continue holding given that ei is
…xed and P0 +P 00q<0 by assumption (to insure the existence of a unique pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium in output). From the latter, we also have that an increase in qi reduces
the LHS of (11) below the LHS of (12). This implies that the amount of abatement under
emission standards, qi ¡ ei, is lower than under taxes and so is the direct e¤ect.
The importance of the strategic e¤ect of emission standards relative to the direct
e¤ect of either taxes or standards depends on the demand curve P(Q) and the emissions
goal E. To see this in a very simple way, consider the following change to the market-
regulatory situation: a positive parallel shift of a linear demand curve from P to ®P
(®>1), with P0 < 0 and P 00 =0unchanged, and the same tax level ¿,w h i c hn e c e s s a r i l y
implies a higher emissions goal E a n de m i s s i o ns t a n d a r d sei. Under tax regulation, this
new situation leads to higher output qi (see (9)), same abatement qi ¡ ei (see eq. (8)),
and hence, higher emissions. Now, the direct e¤ect of either instrument at any ki remains
unchanged because the optimal amount of abatement is not a¤ected by ®.13 And from
(6) and P00 =0 , we can see that the strategic e¤ect increases with q. Thus, by increasing
® (and adjusting E accordingly) we can let the strategic e¤ect of emission standards to
13In the case of taxes is immediate since ¿ has not changed. In the case of emission standards note,






2P0 + P00 ¡ kiC00
i
is indepent of ®.
13be as large as we like without a¤ecting the direct e¤ect under either instrument. We
can summarize the comparison between taxes and emission standards in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 Under Cournot competition in the output market, taxes can provide
more, less, or the same R&D incentives than emission standards.
The R&D ranking between taxes and emission standards will ultimately depend on
the relative importance of the regulatory goal, output demand and R&D production
function f(¢). Emission standards are likely to o¤er greater R&D incentives when the
f(¢) and v are such that only minor innovations take place, and when output demand is
large and/or more inelastic for the strategic e¤ects to be more important. On the other
hand, taxes are likely to provide more incentives at stricter regulatory levels (higher ¿
and lower e) because direct e¤ects become relatively more important. We shall illustrate
these results with the aid of numerical examples.
3.3 Permits
Because grandfathered tradeable permits and auctioned permits are very closely related,
I shall merge their analysis into one but emphasizing their di¤erences as they arise. Thus,
under “permits” regulation and Cournot competition, for any given level of ki and kj,
…rm i maximizes pro…ts
¼i(ki;k j)=P(Q)qi ¡ kiCi(qi ¡ ei) ¡ ¾ ¢ (ei ¡ ²i) (13)
14where ²i is amount of (tradeable) permits received by …rm i and ¾ is the market clearing
price of permits after a total of E permits are distributed gratis by the regulator. If
instead, the E permits are auctioned o¤, ²i =0and both …rms become buyers of permits.
The auction clearing price is the same as in the permits market because there are no
income e¤ects.
Since the permits market (or auction market) operates …rst, we start by solving the
third-period output equilibrium. Firm i takes ei as given, which is the number of permits




i(qi ¡ ei)=0 (14)
Letting b qi(ei) be the solution to the third-period output equilibrium, in the second period
…rm i chooses ei to maximize P(Q)b qi(ei) ¡ kiCi(b qi(ei) ¡ ei) ¡ ¾ ¢ (ei ¡ ²i) .U s i n g t h e




i(b qi(ei) ¡ ei)=kjC
0
j(b qj(ej) ¡ ej)=¾ (15)
ei + ej = E (16)
Thus, the (negative) value of the total derivative of (13) with respect to ki at the
14Firms bargain over ¾ until no further exchange of permits is mutually bene…cial while taking into
account their correct expectation of future outputs b qi and b qj.











(ei ¡ ²i) (17)
The …rst term on the RHS of (17) is the direct e¤ect, the second term is the strategic
e¤ect from the output market and the third term is the strategic e¤ect from the permits
market. While the sign of the direct e¤ect is clearly positive, the sign of other two e¤ects
is not so immediate.
In a permits-Cournot game, environmental R&D cannot readily be interpreted as pure
cost-reducing innovation because there is an interaction in the permits market. Hence,






2(3P0 +2 P 00q ¡ kC00)
(18)
which is negative, since P0 + P00q<0 by assumption. The implication is that a lower
ki, which means lower marginal abatement costs kiC0
i, reduces …rm j’s relative costs,
increasing its output. The explanation is that any R&D investment made by …rm i
“spills over” through the permits market, lowering the price ¾ and consequently reducing
abatement costs for both …rms in the same amount at the margin, which ultimately helps
…rm j to increase output.
Investments in R&D also a¤ect the permits market. As formally demonstrated in
Appendix B, the total e¤ect of R&D on the permits price is negative (i.e., d¾=dki > 0),
16regardless of who invest in R&D; otherwise …rms’ production would be lower after R&D
since marginal production costs are equal to ¾ (see (14)). The sign of this strategic e¤ect
from the permits market depends on whether the …rm i is a seller or buyer of permits. If
the …rm is a buyer of permits (ei >² i), this e¤ect is positive because the …rm now buys
permits at a lower price.




= C(q ¡ e) ¡
P 0C0q ¡ C0 ¢ (3P0 +2 P 00q)(e ¡ ²)
2(3P 0 +2 P00q ¡ kC00)
(19)
While the strategic e¤ect from the output market is always negative for either tradeable
permits or auctioned permits, the strategic e¤ect from the permits market is zero under
tradeable permits (e = ²) and positive under auctioned permits (² =0 ). Therefore, we
can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Under Cournot competition in the output market and imperfect compe-
tition in the permits market, a buyer of permits has greater R&D incentives than a seller
of permits, and consequently, auctioned permits lead to more R&D than grandfathered
permits.
In terms of the Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1984) taxonomy, eq. (19) indicates that when
products are strategic substitutes and …rms are under tradeable permits regulation, it is
optimal to follow a “lean and hungry look” strategy and underinvest in R&D. If …rms
are under auctioned permits regulation, it may be optimal to follow a “top dog” strategy
a n do v e r i n v e s ti nR & D .
The comparison between tradeable permits and the other two regulatory instruments,
17emission standards and taxes, is rather straightforward. At any value of k,d i r e c te ¤ e c t s
under tradeable permits and standards are the same and lower than direct e¤ects under
taxes (unless k =1in which case are equal). And since strategic e¤ects under tradeable
permits are always negative, it follows:
Proposition 3 Under Cournot competition in the output market and imperfect com-
petition in the permits market, tradeable permits o¤er less R&D incentives than either
emission standards or taxes.
T h ec o m p a r i s o nb e t w e e na u c t i o n e dp e r m i t sa n de m i s s i o ns t a n d a r d sa n dt a x e si sm o r e
involved. At any value of k, direct e¤ects under auctioned permits and standards are
the same and lower than direct e¤ects under taxes (unless k =1in which case they are
equal). On the other hand, strategic e¤ects from the permits market can be large enough
for total e¤ects to be higher than total e¤ects under standards and taxes, as we shall see
in the numerical section. Thus, we can establish
Proposition 4 Under Cournot competition in the output market and imperfect compe-
tition in the permits market, auctioned permits can o¤er more, less, or the same R&D
incentives than either emission standards or taxes.
Results so far are based on the assumption of …rms engaged in quantity competition
for the output market. As Fundenberg and Tirole (1984) and Tirole (1988) have already
shown, the sign of the strategic e¤ect may change as …rms engage in price competition for
the output market. As we shall see below, this does not necessarily mean that previous
propositions simply revert under price competition. There are regulatory interactions
that must be taken into account as well.
184 R&D under Bertrand competition
In this section, I repeat the previous analysis but assuming instead that …rms compete
à la Bertrand with di¤erentiated products. The demand curve faced by …rm i is qi ´
Di(pi;p j),w h e r e( i )¡@Di=@pi ¸ @Di=@pj > 0 and (ii) @2Di=@pi@pj > 0.B e c a u s e
products are not necessarily homogenous (i) simply indicates that a …rm’s price change
has an equal or larger e¤ect on its own demand than on its rival’s. On the other hand,
(ii) says that a …rm’s price increase has a smaller e¤ect on its own demand the larger
the price of its rival. I also assume that Di(pi;p j) is not too convex in pi;o t h e r w i s e
second order conditions (SOCs) do not hold. To avoid cluster I will sometimes use the
following notation: D0
1 ´ @Di=@pi, D0
2 ´ @Di=@pj, D00
11 ´ @2Di=@pi@pi and D00
12 = D00
21 ´
@2Di=@pi@pj (the same notation applies if we interchange i by j). Note that even if
products are homogenous, i.e., ¡D0
1 = D0
2, the competitive outcome, i.e., p = kC0,i sn o t
obtained because the emissions cap E acts as a capacity constraint.15
4.1 Emission standards
Under emission standards regulation and Bertrand competition, for any given a level of
ki and kj,… r mi maximizes pro…ts
¼i(ki;k j)=piDi(pi;p j) ¡ kiCi(Di(pi;p j) ¡ ei) (20)
15See Kreps and Scheinkman (1983).






















Because @Di=@pj > 0 and pi >k iC0
i (capacity constraints allow …rm i to exercise some
market power even if product are homogenous), the sign of the strategic e¤ect depends
on dpj=dki (see Appendix C for its derivation). Plugging dpj=dki (see Appendix C for its












where A =( 2 D0
1 ¡k(D0
1)2C00 +(p¡kC0)D00





SOCs for a local maximum require that A<0 and A2¡B2 > 0 (see Appendix C), so, as in
the Cournot game, dpj=dki > 0. Thus, (23) indicates that in this market structure where
products are strategic complements, …rm’s optimal strategy is to behave as a “puppy
dog” and underinvest in R&D.
204.2 Taxes
Under tax regulation and Bertrand competition, for any given level of ki and kj,… r mi
maximizes pro…ts
¼i(ki;k j)=piDi(pi;p j) ¡ kiC(Di(pi;p j) ¡ ei) ¡ ¿ei (24)
The FOCs for ei and pi are, respectively
kiC
0
















Expression (26) indicates that pi and pj are not a¤ected by the choice of ki and kj,




= C(q ¡ e) (27)
As before, under tax regulation there is no strategic e¤ect because …rm i’s R&D invest-
ments do not a¤ect its marginal production costs, and consequently, its output.
Now, we can compare R&D incentives under taxes and emission standards, given by
eqs. (27) and (23) respectively, when …rms play a Bertrand game in the output market.
Before any investment in R&D is undertaken (i.e., k =1 ), (26) and (21) indicate that
output levels are the same by regulatory design (¿ leads to emissions e). This implies that
21the direct e¤ect C(q ¡ e) is the same for both emission standards and taxes. However,
under emission standards regulation there is a negative strategic e¤ect that reduces R&D
incentives, which is measured by the second term of (23). Similarly, at positive levels
of R&D (i.e., k<1), the direct e¤ect is greater under taxes because the corresponding
abatement level is larger. Since strategic e¤ects continue to be negative for emission
standards, it immediately follows the next proposition.
Proposition 5 Under Bertrand competition in the output market, taxes o¤er more R&D
incentives than emission standards.
4.3 Permits
As before, the analysis of grandfathered tradeable permits and auctioned permits are
merged into one. Under permits regulation and Bertrand competition, for any given
level of ki and kj,… r mi maximizes pro…ts
¼i(ki;k j)=piDi(pi;p j) ¡ kiCi(Di(pi;p j) ¡ ei) ¡ ¾ ¢ (ei ¡ ²i) (28)
where ²i is amount of (tradeable) permits received by …rm i and ¾ is the market clearing
price of permits after a total of E permits are distributed gratis by the regulator. If
instead, the E permits are auctioned o¤, ²i =0a n db o t h… r m sa r eb u y e r so fp e r m i t s .
Again, the auction clearing price remains the same as in the permits market because
there are no income e¤ects.
Since the permits market (or auction market) operates …rst, we start by solving the
third-period output equilibrium. Firm i takes ei as given, which is the amount of permits











Letting b pi ´ b pi(ei) be the solution to the third-period price equilibrium, in the second
period …rm i chooses ei to maximize b piDi(b pi; b pj) ¡ kiCi(Di(b pi; b pj) ¡ ei) ¡ ¾ ¢ (ei ¡ ²i) .
Using the envelope theorem, the Nash bargaining equilibrium in the permits market is
given by (Spulber, 1989)16
kiC
0
i(Di(b pi; b pj) ¡ ei)=kjC
0
j(Dj(b pi; b pj) ¡ ej)=¾ (30)
ei + ej = E (31)
Thus, the (negative) value of the total derivative of (28) with respect to ki at the














¢ (ei ¡ ²i) (32)
where the second term of the RHS of (32) is the strategic e¤ect from the output market,
and the third term is the strategic e¤ect from the permits market.
Since pi >k iC0
i and @Di=@pj > 0, the sign of the strategic e¤ect from the output
16Firms bargain over ¾ based on their correct expectation of future prices b pi and b pj.











where A and B are as in section 4.1. Since SOCs require that A +B<0 (see Appendix
C ) ,w ea l s oh a v et h a tdpj=dki > 0. In this permits-Bertrand game, …rm i’s R&D (i.e.,
lower k) leads …rm j to reduce its action pj, and hence increase its pro…ts, not only
because of output complementarity but also because any R&D investment “spills over”
through the permits market reducing abatement costs for both …rms in the same amount
at the margin. Because of this latter e¤ect, it is not di¢cult to show that dpj=dki
under permits is always greater than under emission standards. Formally, this is the case
because A + B<0.
The sign of the strategic e¤ect in the permits market depends on the sign of d¾=dki
a n do nw h e t h e rt h e… r mi is a seller or buyer of permits. Since d¾=dki > 0 (see Appendix
D for its derivation),17 w h e na… r mi sab u y e ro fp e r m i t s( ei >² i), the strategic e¤ect
from the permits market is positive. Accounting for strategic e¤ects in both permits and























In terms of the Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1984) taxonomy, eq. (34) indicates that when
17The value of d¾=dki is unambiguously positive when either products are homogeneous (i.e., D0
1+D0
2 =
0) or the demand curve is linear (i.e., D0
11 = D0
12 =0 ). If products are too di¤erentiated (i.e., D0
1 + D0
2
¿ 0) and the demand curve is very convex (i.e., D00
11 À 0), d¾=dki may become negative. However,
we do not discuss this possibility further here in the interest of a fair comparison with the Cournot
competition that is for homogenous products.
24products are strategic complements, under tradeable permits regulation (i.e., e = ²)i t
is optimal for a …rm to follow a “puppy dog” strategy and underinvest in R&D. Under
auctioned permits regulation (i.e., ² =0 ), on the other hand, it may be optimal for a
…rm to follow a “fat cat” strategy and overinvest in R&D.
We now can proceed to compare permits with emission standards and taxes. Com-
paring R&D incentives under tradeable permits (e = ²) and emission standards only
requires to compare dpj=dki since direct e¤ects are the same for both instruments at any
value of k. Consequently, we have the following proposition
Proposition 6 Under Bertrand competition in the output market and imperfect compe-
tition in the permits market, tradeable permits o¤er less R&D incentives than emission
standards.
Comparing auctioned permits and taxes (see eq. (27)) follows directly from the dis-
cussion between taxes and emission standards of Section 3.2. Before R&D (i.e., ki =1 ),
direct e¤ects are the same by regulatory design. At positive levels of R&D (i.e., ki < 1),
however, direct e¤ects are larger under taxes while strategic e¤ects may be positive under
auctioned permits. For instance, if we reduce D0
2 su¢ciently enough so that the strategic
e¤ect from the output market under auctioned permits decreases, ¡d¼=dk can become
greater under auctioned permits than under taxes. On the other hand, if we make the
regulatory goal stricter (i.e., e is only a small fraction of q)s ot h a tt h ed i r e c te ¤ e c t
under both instruments increases, ¡d¼=dk can become greater under taxes than under
auctioned permits. Therefore, we can establish the following proposition
Proposition 7 Under Bertrand competition in the output market and imperfect compe-
25tition in the permits market, auctioned permits can o¤er more, less or the same R&D
incentives than taxes.
5 Some Numerical Examples
In this section, I develop some numerical examples to illustrate and complement some
of the analytical results shown in the previous sections. The examples are not randomly
selected, but rather to emphasize di¤erences between direct and strategic e¤ects.
5.1 The social optimum: a benchmark
To compare R&D incentives under di¤erent market and regulatory structures, it is useful
to start by establishing some benchmark. For that purpose, I use the optimization
problem of a social planner pursuing …rst-best levels of output, emissions and R&D.
This will also allow us to have some estimate of the divergence between private and
social optimum R&D levels. However, we do not discuss R&D policies that could bring
private investment to social optimum levels because that would also require discussion
of competition policies, which is not the purpose of the paper.
To …nd the social optimum, let …rst h be the marginal harm caused by a unit of
emission (assumed constant for simplicity but without implications for the R&D com-




i(qi ¡ ei) (35)
26kiC
0
i(qi ¡ ei)=h (36)
where p is the output price in either the Cournot or Bertrand game. In our simple
model, (35) indicates that prices are equal to total marginal costs (recall that output costs
are zero), and (36) indicates that marginal abatement costs must be equal to marginal
damage. The …rst-best solution can be achieved by either setting the tax level ¿ = h
or by issuing (or auctioning o¤) an amount E permits such that the equilibrium price
of permits ¾ is equal to h (because of the symmetry of the problem, the social planner
could also achieve the …rst-best by setting emission standards e equal to E=2).
Now, for any given level of ki and kj,l e tW(ki;k j)=CS(qi;q j)¡
P
Ci(qi¡ei)¡(ei+
ej)h be the optimum level of social welfare, where CS(qi;q j) is consumer surplus, and qi
and ei are at their …rst-best levels as estimated above from (35) and (36). To …nd the
…rst-best levels of R&D, K¤
i and K¤
j, the social planer maximizes W(ki;k j)¡(Ki +Kj)v






¡ 2v = ¡2C(q ¡ e) ¢ f
0((1 + µ)K
¤) ¢ (1 + µ) ¡ 2v =0
Using the above …rst-best solution as a benchmark case, I start the numerical examples
with Cournot competition, and then, Bertrand competition.
275.2 Cournot examples
Let P(Q)=a ¡ bQ be the demand curve and C(q ¡ e)=( q ¡ e)2 be abatement costs
before R&D, where Q =2 q.L e tk = f(KT)=( 1¡ °)e¡KT + ° be the R&D production
function, where 0 <°<1, KT =( 1+µ)K,a n dK i st h ea m o u n to fR & De ¤ o r tb ye a c h
…rm in the equilibrium.18 The market and regulatory parameters are chosen to yield a
signi…cant amount of emissions abatement. To simplify matters, the regulatory design is
such that before R&D, marginal abatement costs are equal to marginal harm h.
In the …rst example, Ex. 1, I use the following parameters: a =1 6 , b =0 :2, ° =0 :4,
v =5and h =1 0 . Results in this and following examples are at the …rm level. The …rst
row of Table 1 (“Before R&D”) shows market and regulatory characteristics before R&D
takes place. The regulatory design imposes a signi…cant reduction, q ¡ e,u p o n… r m so f
50%, which is achieved by either levying a tax ¿ =1 0 , issuing a total number of permits
E =1 0 ,w h i c hl e a d st o¾ =1 0 , or setting emission standards e =5for each …rm. Note
that the reason for the output price P(Q) to be close to marginal costs is because the
large price elasticity (¡3 at the market equilibrium), which will make strategic e¤ects to
be relatively less important than direct e¤ects. Firm’s optimal R&D e¤orts, K,f o rt h r e e
levels of R&D spillovers (µ =0 ; 0:5; and 1) and under each of the regulatory regimes
(E. ST., TAX, T. P., and A. P.) are shown in the next 4 rows.19 R&D investments are
larger under taxes (TAX) than under emission standards (E. ST.) and auctioned permits
(A.P.) because direct e¤ects are more important. The parameters of the example were
chosen that it is possible to have no investment under tradeable permits (T.P.).
18Optimal K under each regulatory regime is obtained from (2) and either (6), (10) or (19).
19Note that market and environmental outcomes are not a¤ected by µ. This is because optimal k is
independent of µ (see footnote 9).
28Results for the benchmark case (“Social Opt.”) are in the next row (values for e
and k are not included because they vary with µ). Optimal R&D levels from the …rm
perspective are always below the social optimum in this example and more so with the
degree of spillovers. Naturally, as the degree of spillovers increases, private R&D departs
further from the social optimum by not considering the even higher positive externality
e¤ects of R&D. It is interesting to see that taxes with zero spillover lead to the social
optimum amount of R&D. This is because marginal damage h is constant and equal to
the tax level ¿ and marginal costs kC0(¢) at all times regardless the amount of R&D,
which implies that abatement q ¡ e, and hence, the direct e¤ect C(q ¡ e); for the …rm
and social planner coincide when there are no spillovers. Note that this would not be the
case if marginal damage were a increasing function of emissions.
In Ex. 2, I let the demand curve to increase to a =2 2 , which signi…cantly reduces the
regulatory requirements to 25%. I also increase v f r o m5t o5 . 6t oe n s u r et h a te m i s s i o n s
under “Social Opt.” are positive for all values of µ. This drop in the regulatory goal
makes direct e¤ect relatively less important, which leads to higher R&D under auctioned
permits than under standards and taxes. Finally, in Ex. 3, I keep the 50% regulatory goal
of Ex. 1 and make the demand curve more inelastic setting a = 160 and b =5 .20 Strategic
e¤ects from the output market are now much more important than direct e¤ects, which
leads to higher R&D under standards than under taxes and auctioned permits.
20Ia l s oi n c r e a s ev to 5.7 for the same reasons above.
295.3 Bertrand examples
In the following examples, I continue using a linear demand curve and let Di(pi;p j) ´
qi = a ¡ bpi + cpj,w h e r e¡D0
1 ´ b ¸ c ´ D0
2.21 Cost and R&D production functions
remain the same. In the …rst example of Table 2, Ex. 1, I consider homogenous products
and use the following parameters: a =1 0 , b =0 :5, c =0 :5, ° =0 :4, v =5 :6 and
h =1 0 . With these parameters, the amount of reduction is signi…cant and equal to 50%,
as shown in the …rst row of Table 2 under “Before R&D.” In this example (negative)
strategic e¤ects from the output market are large enough for taxes to lead to more R&D
than auctioned permits. Again, R&D under taxes is equal to the Social optimum level
of R&D when there are no spillovers (µ =0 ) by the same reasons laid out before.
In Ex. 2, I reduce the regulatory goal to 25% and use the following parameters values:
a =2 0 , b = c =1 , ° =0 :4, v =5 :4. Because both direct e¤ects and (negative) strategic
e¤ects from the output market decrease with these new values, auctioned permits not
only lead to more R&D than taxes but also lead to R&D close to the social optimum
level for small spillovers.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have compared a …rm’s incentives to invest in environmental R&D under
di¤erent market structures and environmental policy instruments. Because of market
strategic e¤ects, R&D incentives are found to vary widely across market structures and
instruments. In particular, I found that when …rms’ products are strategic substitutes
21As before, optimal K under each regulatory regime is obtained from (2) and either (23), (27) or
(34).
30(i.e., Cournot), either emission standards, taxes or auctioned permits can provide the
most incentives. But when …rms’ products are strategic complements (i.e., di¤erentiated
Bertrand), either taxes or auctioned permits can provide the most incentives.
A natural question that remains is how the results of the paper change as markets
become more competitive. To answer this question, we can simply extend the model from
t w ot oal a r g en u m b e ro f… r m sc o m p e t i n gàl aC o u r n o t .S t r a t e g i ce ¤ e c t sn ol o n g e rm a t t e r ,
so we need only concentrate on direct e¤ects, or more precisely, on abatement levels qi¡ei.
Before R&D (i.e., k =1 ), direct e¤ects are the same for all instruments by regulatory
design. By the same arguments laid out in the paper (see Section 3.2 for example), at
positive levels of R&D (i.e., k<1), however, direct e¤ects are higher under taxes than
under permits and emission standards because abatement is higher. Consequently, under
perfect competition, tradeable permits, auctioned permits and emission standards lead
to the same amount of R&D but lower than taxes.
Additional to the above …nding is that under perfect competition R&D incentives are
not a¤ected by the way the permits are initially distributed among …rms, and that is why
incentives under grandfathered permits auctioned permits are the same. This is in sharp
contrast with previous literature (e.g., Milliman and Prince, 1989; and Jung et al, 1996),
where authors fail to distinguish between cost savings (including permits payments) and
innovation incentives. The reason is that for any given output price P and permits price
¾, the e¤ect of a change in k on the pro…ts ¼ of a price-taking …rm does not depend on
the distribution of permits ². Even output q is not a¤ected by changes in k,b e c a u s ea t
the margin the additional production cost from the regulation continues to be ¾.
There a few extensions to the model that may be worth exploring. One extension
31would be to consider a di¤erent technology innovation process. It could be modeled a as
patent race where R&D …rms (other than production …rms) compete for the invention of a
more e¢cient technology to be sold to producing …rms either because lowers production
costs or because the regulator imposes …rms to adopt the new technology. Note that
this has already been done for the case of perfect competition in the output market
(Biglaiser and Horowitz, 1995). Another interesting extension would be to consider ex-
ante asymmetries among …rms. Firms will often have di¤erent costs of production and
costs to conduct R&D either because of size (economies of scale) or past experience. Firms
may also have di¤erent costs to adopt new technologies because of previous investments
or commitments like long-term contracts.
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35Appendix A
Under Cournot competition and emission standards regulation, the …rst order condi-








j(qj ¡ ej)=0 (A2)


























































Then, subtracting (A4) from (A3) and rearranging (A4), we obtain the system of equa-





























C0 ¢ (P 0 + P00q)
(P 0 ¡ kC00)(¡3P0 ¡ 2P00q + kC00)
(A7)
This is the fraction of the last term in (6) in the text.
Appendix B
Under Cournot competition and permits regulation, the equilibrium conditions in the













j(qj ¡ ej)=¾ (B3)
ei + ej ¡ E =0 (B4)


































































































































and replacing (B9) into (B5) and (B10) into (B6), to become (B5’) and (B6’), respectively,












2(3P0 +2 P 00q ¡ kC00)
(B12)




(3P 0 +2 P 00q)C0
2(3P 0 +2 P00q ¡ kC00)
(B13)
Appendix C
Under Bertrand competition (regardless of whether products are homogeneous or




















Taking total derivative with respect to ki at the Nash equilibrium in both expressions,


















where A =( 2 D0
1 ¡k(D0
1)2C00 +(p¡kC0)D00





Second order conditions (SOCs) for a local maximum require that A<0 and A2¡B2 > 0.
39Since B>0, the SOCs also imply that A + B<0.






A2 ¡ B2 (C5)
which is positive since D0
1 < 0 and D00
12 > 0. This is part of the last term in (23) in
the text. Note that if the demand curve D(pi;p j) is linear (i.e., D00
12 = D00
11 =0 )i ti s
immediate that A<0, B>0, A + B<0 and dpj=dki > 0.
Appendix D
Under Bertrand competition (regardless of whether products are homogeneous or
di¤erentiated) and permits regulation, the equilibrium conditions in the permits and























j(qj ¡ ej)=¾ (D3)
ei + ej ¡ E =0 (D4)












































































































and replacing (D9) into (D5) and (D10) into (D6), to become (D5’) and (D6’), respec-















which is positive from the second order conditions discussed in Appendix C. Finally, to

















It is not di¢cult to demonstrate that this expression is unambiguously positive when
either products are homogeneous (i.e., D0
1 + D0




42Table 1. R&D under Cournot competition
K
Ex. Scenario ¿;¾ q P(Q) ek µ =0 µ =0 :5 µ =1
1 Before R&D 10 10 12 5 1 – – –
E. ST. n.a. 11.35 11.46 5 0.72 0.620 0.413 0.310
TAX 10 10 12 1.5 0.59 1.161 0.774 0.581
T. P. 10 10 12 5 1 0 0 0
A. P. 10 11.42 11.43 5 0.71 0.652 0.435 0.326
Social Opt. 10 15 10 1.161 1.300 1.180
2 Before R&D 10 20 14 15 1 – – –
E. ST. n.a. 20.74 13.70 15 0.83 0.327 0.218 0.164
TAX 10 20 14 12.75 0.69 0.729 0.486 0.365
T. P. 10 20 14 15 1 0 0 0
A. P. 8.81 21.99 13.21 15 0.63 0.958 0.638 0.479
Social Opt. 10 30 10 0.729 1.178 1.102
3 Before R&D 10 10 60 5 1 – – –
E. ST. n.a. 10.18 58.16 5 0.70 0.701 0.467 0.351
TAX 10 10 60 3.18 0.73 0.589 0.393 0.295
T. P. 10 10 60 5 1 0 0 0
A. P. 10 10.08 59.20 5 0.87 0.254 0.169 0.127
Social Opt. 10 15 10 0.589 1.158 1.090
43Table 2. R&D under Bertrand competition
K
Ex. Scenario ¿;¾ q p e k µ=0 µ =0 :5 µ =1
1 Before R&D 10 10 10 5 1 – – –
E. ST. n.a. 10 10 5 1 0 0 0
TAX 10 10 10 2.75 0.69 0.729 0.486 0.365
T. P. 7.71 10 10 5 1 0 0 0
A. P. 7.87 10 12.13 5 0.79 0.439 0.293 0.219
Social Opt. 10 10 10 0.729 1.178 1.102
2 Before R&D 10 20 10 15 1 – – –
E. ST. n.a. 20 10.04 15 1 0.007 0.005 0.004
TAX 10 20 10 12.21 0.64 0.908 0.605 0.454
T. P. 9.96 20 10.04 15 1 0.006 0.004 0.003
A. P. 6.32 20 13.68 15 0.63 0.949 0.633 0.475
Social Opt. 10 20 10 0.918 1.218 1.128
44